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A striking feature of debates concerning the disposition of
Native American human remains is their invocation of the
conventional domains of science, property, and kinship.
Strong political claims about repatriation tend to assert the
primacy of one domain over the others. Yet in contempo-
rary North American social contexts, these domains have
heterarchical relations in which no single perspective dom-
inates, rather than hierarchical relations organized by a
fixed ranking system. Resolving disputes in heterarchical
systems requires negotiation across domains rather than
privileging one domain. This comment examines how the
relationships between these domains influence debates on
repatriation. It also sheds light on how Americans make
political claims. [heterarchy, hierarchy, human remains,
kinship, Native American, property, repatriation, science]
A striking feature of debates concerning the disposi-
tion of Native American human remains is their invo-
cation of the conventional domains of science,
property, and kinship. Strong political claims about
repatriation tend to assert the primacy of one domain
over the others. Yet in contemporary American social
contexts, these domains have heterarchical relations
in which no single perspective dominates, rather than
hierarchical relations organized by a fixed ranking
system.1 This comment examines how the relation-
ships between these domains influence debates on
repatriation.
Let me begin with the domain of science, which
offers the primary rationale for preserving Native
American human remains in museum collections. In
its modern form, science combines knowledge pro-
duction and particular social roles or professions. Sci-
entific knowledge production is based on a relatively
homogenous social process in which participation is
restricted and hierarchical. Science and society are
treated as separate domains (Nowotny et al. 2001).
The normative status of this model is evident in criti-
cism of how the science of global climate change has
become politicized. Scientists value the pursuit of
knowledge above most other values and support the
principle of open access to information. This is also a
core tenet of liberal, democratic societies. As the Rus-
sian physicist and political dissident Andrei Sakharov
(1968) observed, a society that impedes the free
exchange of ideas is doomed to failure. The contem-
porary academy is modeled on these understandings
of science and how it should be practiced.
However, recent discussions of science and society
point to a transformation in how scientific knowledge
is produced (Nowotny et al. 2001; Ziman 2000).
Knowledge production is increasingly dispersed
across different kinds of institutions and social set-
tings. It is more heterogeneous, socially accountable,
and reflexive. An example is the way in which muse-
ums and communities may undertake collaborations
that neither could complete on their own. This entails
mutual recognition of complementary forms of
expertise. Science and society are no longer treated as
separate domains; Nowotny et al. (2001) argue that
such arrangements produce more socially robust
forms of science.
Rules and practices that restrict access to scientific
information are commonly viewed as being in oppo-
sition to the central values of liberal society. However,
values from other domains regularly override this
principle. For example, under certain conditions
property rights trump access to information.
We make exceptions to rules concerning open access
to facilitate commerce: authors copyright their work
and scientists patent their inventions for limited peri-
ods of time. These protections are intended as both
stimulus for innovation and reward for the invest-
ment of resources. They are a compromise between
the ideal of open access and the desire to promote cre-
ativity (Lessig 2001; Rose 1993). Similarly, the acad-
emy and the archive have not always fulfilled the ideal
of open access to information. For example, Native
Hawaiians once had difficulty in gaining access to the
major repository of mele, the poetic verses that
accompany hula performances (Stillman 2009). More
generally, historians of science and empire have docu-
mented the relationship between scientific knowledge
production and exclusionary practices of racism,
colonialism, and imperialism (Pratt 1992).
The second domain referenced by debates about
repatriation is property, which is also a foundational
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concept of liberal society, and, in the form of private
property, the cornerstone of capitalism. The owner-
ship of property is closely associated with the prevail-
ing form of modern personhood, the possessive
individual (Macpherson 1964; Radin 1993). How-
ever, there are legal limits on ownership (Kirsch 2004;
Rose 1994; Sax 2001). An important example of
restrictions on property rights was established by the
13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which
abolished slavery; the law no longer recognizes prop-
erty interests in human bodies. People are still “viewed
as having control over their bodies and bodily integ-
rity, but not as the result of the laws of property” (Gre-
ely 1998:488). Consequently, scientists who propose
to carry out research on human tissue or DNA must
obtain the permission of their subjects (Rabinow
1996). Individuals regularly agree to participate in
clinical research in the altruistic hope that such studies
will lead to scientific breakthroughs that will benefit
others; the critical issue is consent. A recent legal set-
tlement addresses these issues. From 1990 to 1994, the
Havasupai Indians granted scientists at Arizona State
University permission to use their DNA for research
on diabetes. However, the scientists later used the
DNA samples for projects unrelated to Havasupai
health concerns. The university’s decision to settle
with the Havasupai plaintiffs who objected to these
new studies is considered significant because it sug-
gests that the “rights of the research subjects can be
violated when they are not fully informed about how
their DNAmight be used” (Harmon 2010).
Anthropologists have studied property since the
beginning of the discipline (e.g., Maine 1986; Mali-
nowski 1935). Whereas Euro-American law empha-
sizes private property, the dominant form of
ownership in other societies may be collective. How-
ever, most societies recognize a variety of individual
and collective property rights, as Malinowski (1935:
380) argued in relation to Trobriand Islanders.
Colonial history may be characterized in part by the
inability or refusal of the colonizers to recognize
indigenous property rights (McLaren et al. 2005;
Pocock 1992). These debates continue today as indig-
enous peoples struggle to make collective claims to
cultural property through legal systems that privilege
individual rights (Brown 2003; Coombe 1998; Hirsch
and Strathern 2004). More generally, contemporary
understandings of property are being challenged by
the implications of new technologies, including
whether and how to assign ownership to genes
(Pálsson 2007), human embryos (Strathern 1999),
and pollution (Kirsch 2004).
A brief aside regarding the domain of human
rights is warranted here, as the participants in repatri-
ation debates may also frame their arguments in these
terms (see Trope and Echo-Hawk 2000:140). These
principles articulate the fundamental rights of all
human beings. However, the law generally lags
behind the recognition of human rights, making
them difficult to enforce. Consequently, human
rights claims often remain aspirational (see Goodale
2009). An important component of human rights
claims is that special standing is not required to make
a claim; one can object to the desecration of a ceme-
tery, for example, regardless of whether or not one
has relatives buried there.
The third domain is kinship. Although Americans
say that blood is thicker than water (Schneider
1980:49), anthropologists recognize that kinship
claims are more than just blood: they are also social
relations (Carsten 2003). Kinship relations may also
be legal relationships; the responsibilities of parents
are defined by law as well as matters of proper con-
duct and affect. It is not a coincidence that many of
the founders of the anthropological study of kinship
were lawyers by training, including McLennan (1865)
and Morgan (1870). The courts are also increasingly
called upon to adjudicate kinship disputes in the age
of DNA testing (Strathern 1999, 2005). For example,
the courts have been asked to determine whether or
not someone who acted as a social father to a child by
making child support payments is legally obligated to
continue making those payments even when pater-
nity tests indicate that he is not the biological father
(Strathern 1999:74). The affirmative response follows
a social rather than exclusively biological view of
kinship relations. In this case, the social definition of
kinship trumps scientific information.
Although kinship and the law are closely inter-
twined, the prevailing assumption is that in family
matters the courts should defer to kin except under
extenuating circumstances (Strathern 2005:16). This
is most clearly seen in the restraint exercised by the
state with regard to interference with the parental care
of children. One instance in which this principle
was ignored was the placement of Native American
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children into boarding schools, separating them from
their family members and preventing them from
speaking their own languages; these interventions
were subsequently addressed by the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (Smith 2005).
Possession is said to be nine-tenths of the law, but
anthropologists recognize that kinship is nine-tenths
of ownership through inheritance and succession.
In other words, kinship guides many forms of prop-
erty distribution, including real property in land and
things as well as titles, social roles, and, in some cases,
occupational status. But kinship and ownership
belong to different domains. A husband and wife have
certain legal rights vis-à-vis one another, but this does
not include ownership. Kinship is better understood
in terms of responsibility: I may or may not be my
brother’s keeper, but I am certainly not his owner.
To invoke ownership with respect to kin is a category
error. Similarly, some Native Americans reject the
invocation of property rights with respect to human
remains, which they view as kin rather than property.
Kinship claims regarding the disposition of human
remains might be compared to how people take
responsibility for relatives who are unable to commu-
nicate their intentions because they are minors or
adults compromised by illness. In the United States,
the next of kin have the right to arrange for the burial
of the deceased (Greely 1998:488). In the context of
repatriation, Native Americans may also see them-
selves as protecting the interests of their kin. These
may be more than secular duties, however, as caring
for one’s ancestors is often understood as a religious
obligation. The extended care and concern with which
such responsibilities toward human remains are dis-
charged is well documented for many other societies
as well (e.g., Feeley-Harnik 1991; Richards 2010).
Societies vary in how broadly they define the scope
of kinship relations. Nuclear families in the United
States often maintain relatively shallow genealogies.
However, in other societies, even remote ancestors
may be regarded as members of one’s family; there is
no parting of the ways with kin at death. In other
cases, such as with Trobriand Islanders, the members
of future generations are already members of one’s
lineage (Weiner 1976). But it would be a mistake to
treat these differences as oppositions. Americans can
and do recognize lengthy genealogies, especially when
they are associated with property and privilege; a Ford
still runs Ford Motor Company, for example. Kinship
relations are always subject to telescoping and col-
lapse for various purposes; such flexibility is one of
the hallmarks of kinship rather than an anomaly.
Given the racialized history of kinship in the
United States (Dominguez 1986), it is not surprising
that Native American claims about kinship and
relatedness may be retrospectively extended beyond
contemporary tribal boundaries in claims regarding
the disposition of culturally unaffiliated human
remains. Nor can these identifications be separated
from the historical contexts in which native peoples
have lost land, cultural knowledge, and, in many
cases, their languages through historical policies
and practices of genocide, dispossession, and forced
assimilation (Fine-Dare 2002). Shared histories of
oppression have become de facto components of
indigenous identity in many contexts (Niezen 2003).
Repatriation is important to Native Americans both
in terms of the proper treatment of their relatives
(writ large) and as partial reparation for past injus-
tices (Fine-Dare 2002; Mihesuah 2000). Gaining
federal recognition, reclaiming tribal lands, revitaliz-
ing endangered languages, and repatriating the
remains of fellow Native Americans are political
responses to the colonial legacy with which Native
Americans continue to struggle (Riding In 2000).
As I have indicated, North Americans regularly
make reference to all of these domains. The pursuit of
knowledge and understanding is not limited to
scientific research by students and professors. All
members of the state seek protection under the law.
Everyone values their families and kin. Americans also
regularly invoke more than one of these domains at a
time to establish priorities and settle disputes. These
interactions must be carefully negotiated as there is no
stable hierarchy of values through which claims to the
primacy of one domain over the others can be made.
Given their heterarchical relations, invoking principles
from multiple domains may result in complex and
even controversial interactions, as when scientific
knowledge about wetlands affects how landowners are
permitted to make use of private property, or when
estate taxes must be paid on an inheritance.
However, participants in debates concerning
repatriation often restrict their claims to a single
domain. As scientists, archaeologists may treat human
remains primarily in terms of the research questions
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they can help to answer. As institutions chartered by
law, universities and museums may view the same
human remains primarily in terms of property rights
governing their disposition, most notably compliance
with the provisions of the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA). Native
Americans tend to view these human remains as
ancestors and kin to whom they have important and
even sacred responsibilities, but they also value
repatriation as a political act of decolonization. The
participants in these debates may be looking at the
same material artifacts but seeing something entirely
different (see Henare et al. 2006). However, there are
other ways to think about these issues. Archaeologists
increasingly draw on collaborative models of science
when working with Native American communities
and vice versa (Colwell-Chanthaphonh and Ferguson
2008; Thomas 2000). Universities and museums are
actively seeking to improve relations with Native
Americans and otherminority populations. New rules
concerning the disposition of culturally unaffiliated
human remains may help to resolve some of the
outstanding claims, but given their emphasis on prop-
erty rights, they cannot be expected to solve all the
problems. For example, some archaeologists feel that
the new regulations do not sufficiently value knowl-
edge or research about the past (Sinopoli 2010).
Writing about the domains of gender, kinship,
and science, Marilyn Strathern suggests that “if a cul-
ture consists in established ways of bringing ideas
from different domains together, then new combina-
tions—deliberate or not—will not just extend the
meanings of the domains so juxtaposed; one may
expect a ricochet effect, that shifts of emphasis, disso-
lutions and anticipations will bounce off one area of
life onto another’’ (1992:3). However, Strathern
acknowledges that culture “has its constraints and its
effects on how people act, react and conceptualize
what is going on around them: it is the way people
imagine things really are’’ (1992:3). Thus it is not
unexpected that debates about repatriation bequeath
us both impasses and opportunities. By recognizing
the way these debates cross heterarchically organized
domains, we can treat the resulting negotiations as a
source of information about how Americans make
political claims. We can also anticipate that these
debates will transform future relationships between
science, property, and kinship. But proper resolution
of these debates will require participants to attend to
relationships across these domains and to understand
how and why such claims are made.
Acknowledgments
This comment was presented at a roundtable discussion
on repatriation at the University of Michigan and benefit-
ted from the ensuing discussion. The event was organized
by the interdisciplinary graduate student workshop on
ethnography-as-activism. Comments from the editors and
anonymous reviewers for Museum Anthropology were
particularly instructive. I thank Gillian Feeley-Harnik,
Mark Goodale, Lisa Kealhofer, Eleanor King, Regev
Nathansohn, Angela Parker, Veronica Pasfield, Michael
Wood, and especially Kelly Fayard for their insightful feed-
back and suggestions, although the views presented herein
are the sole responsibility of the author.
note
1. A classic example of heterarchy is the children’s game of
paper, scissors, rocks, in which paper covers rock (thus
defeating it), but scissors cut paper, and rocks break scis-
sors. There is dominance without hierarchy. Archaeologists
use the concept of heterarchy to describe power relations in
societies that lack rigid stratification (Ehrenreich et al. 1995).
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